University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 84

Issue 3

Article 1

August 2018

The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting
Lori D. Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr

Recommended Citation
Lori D. Johnson, The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting, 84 U. Cin. L. Rev. 595 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Johnson: The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting

THE ETHICS OF NON-TRADITIONAL CONTRACT DRAFTING
Lori D. Johnson*
Abstract
A new generation of contract drafters faces
increasing commentary advising them to change
traditional contract terms into plain language
constructions. Yet, traditional, tested terms have
consistent meanings, and when these meanings
benefit client objectives, advocates should consider
retainingthem. This articleposits thatfailing to do
so can impact a lawyer's ethical obligations.
Specifically, an attorney's duties of competence,
and
diligence,
authority,
of
allocation
communication under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct require careful thought
about modernizing tested contract terms. These
duties require the ethical drafter to research
whether the use of a traditional, tested term
advances a client goal more effectively, and
communicate with the client concerning the risks
associatedwith the potentialchange.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"My biggest problem with modernity may lie in the growing
separationof the ethical and the legal. Nassim Nicholas Taleb

The modern transactional attorney's daily practice consists of
structuring, counseling, advising, negotiating and drafting the terms of
clients' contracts, down to the smallest detail. In essence, using
language to bring to life the often complex and delicate arrangements
between parties entering into business relationships. The words of a
contract can carry millions of dollars worth of importance, can provide
the client with rights, or strip them away, depending on how an
opposing party or court interprets them. Therefore, every time a
transactional lawyer makes a language choice, they are engaging a form
of client advocacy, attempting to prepare a contract that sits at the
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intersection of applicable law, client interests, and the business deal.
Why then, do the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provide such scarce guidance to
2 The
transactional practitioners engaged in contract drafting choices?
modem transactional attorney is buffeted with choices on how best to
structure the language of a client's contract. The lawyer, the law firm,
and even the client may have tested forms, and today's drafter may also
be trained in the benefits of the plain-language approach to drafting. The
way in which the Model Rules apply to transactional attorneys must
evolve to provide guidance to attorneys grappling with these competing
voices.
This Article seeks to clarify the role of the modem transactional
attorney, and show that heightened ethical responsibilities exist when
seeking to rephrase traditional, tested contract language into modern
prose. Specifically, the competence and diligence duties imposed by the
Model Rules require particularly careful research, consideration, and
cost-consciousness to be assured that the new construction will
efficiently and effectively achieve the client's goals. Further, enhanced
communication with the client is required to determine the client's risk
tolerance in connection with proposed untested language.
Part II will provide
This Article will proceed in five parts.
language movement
plain
the
of
influence
background on the growing
on contract drafting style. Part III will review current modes of
understanding ethical obligations of contract drafters and examine the
weaknesses of those modes. Part IV will explore additional means of
regulating the behavior of modern drafters of sophisticated contracts.
Part V will undertake case studies concerning particular language
choices and duties to clients. Finally, Part VI will recommend potential
changes to the way ethical rules are interpreted and applied to drafters of
complex contracts.

II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE MOVEMENT'S IMPACT ON DRAFTING
As the number of law students leaving law school with a foundation
in contract drafting instruction increases, so too does the tension
between the traditional drafting style employed by some seasoned
practitioners, and the influence of the relatively recent call by certain3
commentators for a broader use of plain language in contract drafting.
1. TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: How AND WHY LAWYERS Do WHAT THEY Do 3,
STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS].

369 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter

2. Id. at 455 (noting that there are no Model Rules specifically applicable to transactional
practice).
3. Lori D. Johnson, Say the Magic Word: A RhetoricalAnalysis of ContractDrafting Choices,
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The dawn of the modem plain language movement has coincided with
the increase in legal drafting instruction in law schools, and the gamechanging attitudes of some modem drafting scholars concerning
modernizing language choices have become more instructive to young
lawyers. 4
The plain language movement began with David Mellinkoff's The
Language of the Law in 1963 and expanded in Richard Wydick's widely
cited PlainEnglishfor Lawyers in 1979.5 These works formed the basis
of a movement spanning more than fifty years6 and encompassing
hundreds of books in the U.S. and abroad touting its many benefits. 7
While the earliest applications of the movement focused on "consumer
contracts" and other public documents, 8 more recently, some scholars of
drafting style have argued that its benefits extend to the context of
sophisticated contracts. 9
Specifically, Bryan Garner, in his widely influential book Legal
Writing in Plain English, suggests applying the plain language
movement to contracts to make their language accessible to "ordinary
readers."10 Further, Kenneth Adams, author of the ABA's Manual of
Style for Contract Drafting, suggests that drafters should "turn[]
traditional contract prose into a specialized version of standard
English."1 1 These scholars go beyond the call for the removal of pure
"lawyerisms" 12 and suggest revisions to some of the most deeply-rooted
3

language used by contract drafters.'
65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 451, 455 (2015).

4. See AM. BAR ASS'N, SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW

SCHOOL CURRICULA: 2002-2010 78 (Catherine L. Carpenter et al. eds., 2012) (noting that as of 2010,
122 law schools offered some course in the area of contract drafting, up from only 31 schools in 1992);
see also KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING § 1.22 (ABA Bus. Law
Section 3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE]; BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN
PLAIN ENGLISH 109 (Univ. of Chi. Free Press 2d ed. 2012) (influential drafting style guides which
emphasize a broad use of plain language in contract drafting).
5. See generally DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (Little, Brown & Co.
1963); RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (Carolina Academic Press 5th ed. 2005).
6. JOSEPH KIMBLE, WRITING FOR DOLLARS, WRITING TO PLEASE: THE CASE FOR PLAIN
LANGUAGE IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND LAW 11 (Carolina Academic Press 2012).

7. See generally id at 47-102.
8. Id.at 54-59 (discussing New York's Plain English Law for consumer contracts passed in
1977).
9. See ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supranote 4 at xxix; GARNER, supra note 4, at 109-12.
10. GARNER, supranote 4, at 109.
1.1. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 4, at § 1.22.
12. GEORGE W. KUNEY, THE ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT DRAFTING: WITH QUESTIONS AND
CLAUSES FOR CONSIDERATION 18, 47 (3d ed. 2011).

13. See ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 4, §§ 1.7-1.30. Adams defines "legal terms of
art" as "words and phrases that have a specialized doctrinal meaning" and suggests that such phrases be
omitted from contracts. Id.§§ 1.6-1.7. He notes that drafters often rely on such "traditional contract
language" because it "has been litigated or 'tested' Id.at 1.30. However, Adams suggests that such
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However, going beyond the removal of "pure gobbledygook" and
meaningless jargon (such as "aforementioned" and "hereinafter") 14 to
suggest a broader re-writing of traditional contract language extends
beyond the initial policies of the plain language movement.' 5 It is
correct that removing most archaic lawyerisms reduces ambiguity and
increases readability of contracts.' 6 However, earlier proponents of
embody a
clear drafting style understood that contracts
"[c]ommunication based on the language habits" of a particular speech
require some "adherence to the existing
community, and therefore
' 17
conventions of language."
Particularly, Reed Dickerson suggested that adherence to traditional
language is compelling in the context of transactional drafting because
contracts constitute a communication whose "ultimate audience" goes
beyond the parties, including "the courts and other agencies that may be
called upon to enforce them."1 8 While Garner is correct to note that
"only a small fraction of 1%" of all contracts are ever litigated1 9, this
statistic fails to recognize that the specter of litigation influences the
behavior of drafters and parties to contracts in a pre-litigious setting.2 °
The certainty of a consistent judicial application in a particular
jurisdiction can have significant impact on the choice of terms and
parties' behavior in structuring a transaction.2 1
Dickerson's theory concerning the consideration of the judicial reader
is reflected by modem drafting scholars who have recognized that best
practice in drafting "requires the drafter to think about the contract from
the perspective of all persons that may later be called upon to interpret
it," including "the parties" as well as "judges, arbitrators, or other
decision makers who may be called upon to resolve a dispute by
construing the agreement in light of the language, context, and pertinent
legal rules. 2 2
justification for the retention of such language is a "lazy platitude." Id. § 1.36.
14. REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 3 (Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed.
1965).
15. See KIMBLE, supra note 6, at 47-48.
16. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 4, §§ 1.3-1.6.
17. DICKERSON, supranote 14, at 19.
18. Id. at 18-19.
19. GARNER, supra note 4, at 109.
20. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 484-87.

For example, the existence of judicially tested

language in a contract may negate extensive argument when disagreement arises in that an incipient
controversy may dissipate quickly when one party can demonstrate a high likelihood of prevailing in its

position regarding contract meaning. In more protracted disagreements, the degree of established
meaning associated with the contract language at issue will frame and affect settlement negotiations.
21. Id.
22. James P. Nehf, Writing Contracts in the Client's Interest, 51 S.C. L. REV. 153, 155 (1999).
See also STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 3 (recognizing that applicable law is directly
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By suggesting untested constructions in place of traditional terms,
Adams and Garner propose the use of experimental constructions in
place of language consistently interpreted by decision makers. This
choice carries risk avoided when using tested terms. Specifically, the
concept of "learning externalities" proposed by Mitu Gulati and Robert
Scott suggests that "standard, widely used" 2 3 terms are known,
understood, and less likely to be "erroneous[ly] interpret[ed] by a
court., 24 This theory suggests that higher risk of misinterpretation and
decreased efficiency may result by the use of alternative, untested
language.
Further, modem critics of the plain language movement have noted
that terms of art, and even the broader subset of "technical language" of
the law remain incomprehensible to a lay audience, despite any
rephrasing, because understanding such language requires "specialized
knowledge of the legal context" in which the terms operate. 25 Further,
any "translation of such expressions" is "insufficient to make them fully
intelligible, because their incomprehensibility lies in the fact that they
refer to a legal rule, practice, concept, or doctrine" lying outside their
plain linguistic meaning.2 6
Nevertheless, one policy suggested in support of removing tested
constructions is a resistance to "the idea that if a court offers its
interpretation of confusing contract language, we're forevermore
committed to using that confusing contract language to convey that
meaning., 27 Yet, not all tested terms are confusing, and in some
instances, a court's preferred construction of a term may be in the
client's best interest. In such circumstance, the ethics of advocacy
dictate that a transactional attorney should use the tested term. These
ethical obligations must be further explored to understand the ethical
duties of the contract drafter in making language choices.

III.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DRAFTING

To better understand the weaknesses of the current ethical guidelines
as applied to the modern transactional attorney engaged in complex
language choices, one must examine: (A) the history of regulation of
relevant to drafting choices).
23. MITu GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3Y MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE

LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 10-11 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2013).
24. Id.at 34.

25. Rabeea Assy, Can the Law Speak Directly to its Subjects? The Limitation of PlainLanguage,
38 J. OF L. & SOC. 376, 400 (2011).

26. Id.
27. Kenneth A. Adams, 'Tested' meet 'Market', ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/tested-meet-market/.
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transactional attorneys in the U.S. legal profession; (B) the absence of
neutrality in modem drafting practice; (C) the evolving role of
transactional attorneys as advocates in the U.S. legal system; and (D) the
existing Model Rules that ethics scholars have argued apply to the
behavior of transactional attorneys.
A. History of ProfessionalRegulation of TransactionalAttorneys
Little scholarship or commentary exists concerning the ethical duties
of attorneys engaged in drafting contracts.2 8 The paucity of regulation
and discussion of the behavior of transactional attorneys can be traced to
the fact that the predecessors to the current Model Rules 29, including: (i)
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (the Canons); 30 and (ii) the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code),3 1 focused
primarily on the behavior of litigating attorneys.
The Canons, published in 1908, "dealt almost exclusively with the
dilemmas" 32 of the litigator, and the Code, published in 1969, offered
little improvement. Even the "aspirational" Ethical Considerations of
the Code, meant to "suggest proper ethical behavior" served as
"basically a guide to the litigating attorney" working in the adversarial
context.33
Scholars active at the time of the drafting of the Code recognized an
ongoing "historical bias" toward regulating the role of the litigator more
stringently than the role of the transactional attorney. 34 Even as early as
1976, ethics scholars noted this bias was "inappropriate" due to the
evolving role of the mid-century transactional
attorney as a counselor
35
and advisor in preventive functions.
Nonetheless, the current Model Rules, originally drafted in 1983, a
version of which have been adopted in 49 states and the District of
Columbia, 36 are similarly premised on an adversarial, litigation-based

28. Gregory M. Duhl, The Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 989, 990
(2010) [hereinafter, Duhl, Ethics]; see also, TINA STARK, TEACHER'S MANUAL, DRAFTING CONTRACTS:
How AND WHY LAWYERS Do WHAT THEY Do 319 (Wolters Kluwer 2014).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 2012).
30. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
31. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1969).
32. Louis M. Brown & Harold A. Brown,

What Counsel the Counselor? The Code of

ProfessionalResponsibility's Ethical Considerations-APreventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U. L. REV.
453, 455 (1976).
33. Id.at 453.
34. Id. at 455.
35. Id. at 453-54.
36. STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3
(Wolters Kluwer 2015).
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system.37 Modem drafting scholars have acknowledged that "with
limited exceptions" there are no Model Rules directly on point
concerning professional behavior by transactional attorneys.
The few Model Rules acknowledged as applying to the role of the
transactional attorney provide limitations on making misrepresentations
and assisting clients in undertaking fraudulent behavior. 39 Beyond these
fraud-based proscriptions, the Model Rules provide little guidance to
transactional attorneys in their daily tasks of translating clients'
cooperative business deals into workable and enforceable documents.
Such work often goes on behind closed doors, rather than in the open
forum of the courtroom, making discipline more difficult. 40 However,
the informal nature of transactional practice should provide a strong
incentive for a more readily applicable set of behavioral standards.
Consistent with the goal of attempting to regulate the behavior of
attorneys during the drafting process, Gregory Duhl authored a recent
and comprehensive examination of the ethics of contract drafting.4 1
Duhl's analysis supports a thesis that the goal of ethical obligations
imposed on drafters should be consistent with contract law and its
purpose of promoting trust between contracting parties. 4 2 However, this
obligation exists in tension with the reality that in the sophisticated
commercial context, each side to the transaction typically retains their
own counsel, who
draft and negotiate contract terms on their specific
43
client's behalf.
Complicating the issue of regulating ethics during the drafting
process is the private nature of such non-litigation practice. Most often,
errors and ethical lapses in drafting are only discovered and raised by 44a
party seeking to "avoid an unfavorable contract" after its execution.
Additionally, the role of the drafter is often "unconstrained by" the types
of "formal procedures" applicable to trial attorneys, making it "more
difficult to state comprehensively the ethical considerations" of
transactional practice 45.
This article proposes that ethical guidelines for contract drafters arise
from a broader set of Model Rules than those most often identified by
ethics and drafting scholars. Further, the applicable Model Rules
37. Duhl, Ethics, supra note 28, at 995.
38. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supranote 1, at 455.
39. Duhl, Ethics, supranote 28, at 995.
40. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supranote 1, at 456.

41. See generally Duhl, Ethics, supra note 28.
42. Id.at 994.
43. See Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in the Interpretation of
ContractualInconsistencies, 71 U. PITT.L. REV 71, 112 (2009) [hereinafter Duhl, Cerberus].
44. Duhl, Ethics, supranote 28, at 992.
45. Brown & Brown, supra note 32, at 456.
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should, whether through interpretive opinions by the ABA, revisions to
the comments to the Model Rules, or otherwise, be designed as clear and
enforceable at the time of the initial drafting and negotiation of a
contract. Such an understanding and potential revision of the Model
Rules encourages ethical behavior throughout the contract drafting
process, particularly in light of the aforementioned calls for changes in
contract language.
B. Role of the Modern TransactionalAttorney: Not a Mere Scrivener
To understand legal ethics as applied to the modem practice of
sophisticated contract drafting, those regulating the profession must
come to understand the multifaceted role of today's sophisticated
transactional attorney. While litigators and clients may view the art of
drafting as mere "wordsmithing,, 46 and scholars of ethics tend to treat
transactional attorneys as advisors rather than advocates, neither of these
views provides a complete understanding of current sophisticated
transactional practice.47 Therefore, Duhl's notion of the promotion of
trust as a basis for ethical obligations in transactional practice faces
challenges grounded in misunderstandings of the modem transactional
attorney's role.
Yet, Duhl's concept of trust creation has its merits. First, the
aspirational goal of promoting trust between parties might serve as an
appropriate basis for drafting ethics where opposing parties have been
categorically unrepresented. An example is attorney preparation of form
or adhesion contracts applying to consumers or individuals who will
sign with little or no chance to review or negotiate the terms. In such
circumstances, ethics scholars have warned that drafters should attempt
to do away with the sense of "adversarial tradition" and draft fairly to
promote trust.48 However, this is not the usual scenario in complex
transactional practice in the U.S., where each party typically retains its
own counsel and terms are heavily negotiated between parties.
Additionally, Duhl's ideal of trust in drafting ethics could also apply
in a legal system where the drafter of the contract acts as a neutral
scrivener. For example, civil law countries employ notaries to draft
' 49
transactional documents to reflect the "subjective will of all parties.
46. CHARLES M. Fox, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN'T TEACH YOU

35 (2d ed. 2008).
47. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 456-57 (noting that the drafter is not a
"mere scrivener" but rather "adds value to the deal and advances the client's objective").
48. Paul D. Carrington, UnconscionableLawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361, 370 (2002).
49. Celeste M. Hammond & llaria Landini, The Global Subprime Crisis as Explained by the
Contrast Between American Contracts Law and Civil Law Countries' Laws, Practices, and
Expectations in Real Estate Transactions: How the Lack of Informed Consent and the Absence of the
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These neutral scriveners also counsel all parties in connection with the
terms and consequences of the documents. 50 In this role, civil law
notaries act objectively to promote trust in ways not undertaken (and not
permitted) by U.S. transactional attorneys. In a notarial system, the ideal
of trust promotion could also help to shape ethical guidelines.
However, in the drafting and negotiation of sophisticated contracts in
the U.S., each side of the deal typically retains their own attorney,
responsible for negotiating, reviewing, and drafting contract terms on
their behalf.51 While it is possible in some circumstances for a U.S.
attorney to be retained as a neutral scrivener of a document, this is an
unusual scenario wherein the drafter must take extreme care to clearly
define her role as representative of neither party individually. 52 Doing
so is fraught with potential conflicts of interest under the53Model Rules,
and therefore most often avoided by the prudent attorney.
Even in a friendly, cooperative transaction, there exists the possibility
that the structure of an agreement or inclusion of a particular term will
benefit one side or another. Proceeding with dual representation in the
face of this specter of conflict is prohibited under Model Rule 1.7, which
provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if

. .

. there is a

significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will54 be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client."
Scholars of transactional law and ethics have recognized that the
directly adverse conflicts prohibited under Model Rule 1.7 "can ... arise

in transactional matters. 55 The revisions to the Model Rules in 2000
even expanded the commentary to Model Rule 1.7 to clarify that the
rules "equate the representation of buyers or sellers in buy-sale
transactions with the representation of plaintiffs or defendants in
lawsuits. 56
As such, the Model Rules implicitly recognize "the same amount of
adversity,, 57 between attorneys representing opposing parties in buy-sell
type transactions and those engaged in litigation. While it has been

Civil Law Notary in the United States Contributed to the Global Crisis in Subprime Mortgage
Investments, 11 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 133, 161-62 (2012) (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. See Duhl, Cerberus,supranote 43, at 112.
52. Robert L. Kehr, Write It Up: An Attorney May Be Able to Act As A Scrivener by Putting A
Deal into Writing As Long As the Attorney Does Not Represent Either Party, L.A. LAW. (Sept. 2011), at
20.
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 7 (2012).
54. Id r. 1.7(a)(2) (2012).
55. Carl A. Pierce, Ethics 2000 and the Transactional Practitioner, 3 TRANSACTIONS 7, 13
(2002).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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noted that the Model Rules themselves "do not provide a clear answer
about whether business advisors should be guided by zealous
advocacy," the practice of transactional lawyering clearly positions
attorneys to advance client goals, which constitutes some level of
advocacy. 58 Thus, the suggested modes of viewing drafters as neutral,
trust-promoting advisors are insufficient, and the related attempts to
provided ethical guidelines on this basis fall short.
C. Boundarieson the TransactionalAttorney as Advocate
One weakness of the existing scholarship on drafting ethics is rooted
in the traditional paradigm of the litigator as "advocate," and the
transactional attorney as "advisor., 59 As demonstrated, there exists
, more overlap between these two realms than traditionally understood.
At the root of this tension lies the "incomplete and often confusing
messages found in professional conduct rules about the business
advisor's role." 60 The role of the transactional attorney must be reexamined and refrained in order to determine the most advantageous set
of ethical guidelines for the modem transactional attorney.
Modem scholars of drafting recognize that today's transactional
attorneys do not merely draft contracts, but also negotiate disputes,
analyze precedent, evaluate business issues, and "add value to the deal"
by "advance[ing] client objectives. ' 61 Even traditional ethics scholars
who promoted the old-fashioned framing of the transactional attorney's
role as a pure advisor were forced to recognize that the attorney's task in
structuring a transaction "is to guide the client . . . to act in such a
62
manner that the result will be beneficial.,
This shift in perception is reflected in modem scholarship concerning
the best practices of transactional attorneys, which recognizes that client
expectations are the "foremost" concern of the good drafter. 63 The
question becomes how a transactional attorney should ideally strive to
achieve this benefit for the client when the Model Rules fail to provide
64
the same "comprehensive, consistent guidance" provided to litigators.
It is clear that the traditional construct of the "zealous advocate" often
championed by the litigator does not provide a good fit for the role of

58. Paula Schafer, Harming Business Clients With Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney
Advisor's Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251,256 (2011).
59. See Brown & Brown, supra note 32, at 453.
60. Schaefer, supra note 58, at 253.
61. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 3, 456-57.
62. Brown & Brown, supra note 32, at 460 (emphasis added).
63. Nehf, supra note 22, at 154.
64. Schaefer, supra note 58, at 275.
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the modem transactional attorney. 65 Advocacy that is too zealous can
lure the transactional attorney into acting more as the client's
"instrument" in entering into potentially ill-advised, though technically
legal, transactions. 66 Overzealous advocacy on behalf of a transactional
client can begin to hedge toward fraud, one of the main problems
currently recognized by ethics scholars and regulated by the Model
Rules in the transactional setting. This issue is further discussed in Part
III.D. of this Article.
The ideal role of the transactional attorney is to draft a document that
will provide the greatest benefit to a specific client while attempting to
fairly reflect the terms of the deal agreed upon by the parties.68 In this
way, a transactional attorney can still "add value to the deal" from a
client's perspective while avoiding "crossing the line" into re-cutting the
deal or committing fraud. 69 The value the attorney adds for the client
can include persuading opposing parties to act in favorable ways during
the term of the contract as well as setting the client up for success in
advance of a potential dispute.
As such, the "best approach" to contract drafting is "one that is dealpreserving and with the judge in mind.", 70 This recognition of client
benefit is not wholly inconsistent with the idea of contract drafting as a
fair and cooperative enterprise. Contract drafting experts have noted
that a "contract can be both pro-client and pro-relationship at the same
A contract that withstands the interpretation of a court and
time."
72
interests "will ultimately be in [the] client's best interest."
party
aligns
When viewing a contract as a document that exists to persuade parties
to act in favorable ways and gives rise to favorable interpretations, it
becomes clear that drafting terms in a contract on behalf of a client
constitutes a form of advocacy. Scholars of rhetoric and advocacy have
noted that agreement with a proposed conclusion "rests upon the ability
of one proponent to persuade another, or to persuade an authoritative
decision maker, to read a document or to understand a situation in a
65. Id. at 281-82.
66. Id. at 260.
67. Id. at 277-78.
68. See STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 456-57 (drafting expert Stark explains
the drafter's role as requiring "facilitat[ion] through drafting... [of] an agreement between the parties.
But this role does not render the drafter a mere scrivener. By working with a client to flesh out the
business deal, a drafter adds value to the deal and advances the client's objective. A drafter may not,
however, recut the parties' business deal by adding or changing provisions to which the parties have not
agreed. Doing so steps over the line" (emphasis added)).
69. Id.
70. Scott J. Burnham et al., TransactionalSkills Training:Contract Drafting-Beyondthe Basics,
2009 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 253, 268 (2009).
71. Id. at 269.
72. Id.
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certain way." 73 This mode of persuasion is most certainly undertaken by
a sophisticated drafter preparing a contract on behalf of a client.
Thus, contract drafters' attempts to control the actions of opposing
parties and interpretations of a judge constitute advocacy. As such,
these actions become part of the adversarial system that the Model Rules
attempt to regulate. However, the Model Rules, as currently interpreted
and enforced, do not provide guidance to transactional attorneys
engaged in the role of advocate. Many checks placed on the advocacy
of attorneys under the Model Rules are inherent in "the watching"
function of the courts.74 Yet, "no one is watching" when a transactional
attorney is at work.75
Recognizing contract drafting as the work of two or more advocates,
it is simply insufficient to rely on the limited guidance of the Model
Rules currently identified in scholarship as applying to transactional
practitioners and hope that "attorneys ... police each other." 76 There
are only a handful of Model Rules and related comments commonly
identified to constrain drafters' conduct. These limitations primarily are
focused on the commission of fraud. A deeper discussion of the Model
Rules, as currently interpreted, and identification of opportunities within
the existing Model Rules to shape the behavior of contract drafters as
advocates must be undertaken.
D. Enforcement Against TransactionalAttorneys Under the
CurrentModel Rules
In his recent examination of the ethics of contract drafting, Gregory
Duhl argued that the most evident violations of the Model Rules by
contract drafters occur where the drafter engages in fraudulent or
"fraudulent-type" behavior. 77 These behaviors are regulated under
Model Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(a) and (b) and 8.4.78 Yet, these rules "place
79
only limited restrictions on a lawyer's conduct in drafting contracts."
Specifically, Rule 1.2(d) states that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent." Rule 4.1 states that
[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not

73. Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric": A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 11 (2010).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Schaefer, supranote 58, at 262.
Id.
Duhl, Ethics, supra note 28, at 1011.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 995.
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knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact when

disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client." Finally, Rule 8.4 says "[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . ..engage in

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
conduct involving
80
misrepresentation.
Based on these rules, Duhl hypothesizes three types of fraudulent or
near-fraudulent drafting that could result in ethical violations: (a)
knowingly drafting false representations and warranties; (b) committing
error; and (c) knowingly
fraud, conscious ambiguity, or transcription
81
drafting invalid or "iffy" provisions.
These violations envision a spectrum of behavior in the realm of fraud
and deception, but not including reckless or negligent behavior.
Drafting expert Tina Stark agrees that whether a drafter's behavior
"cross[es] the line" into the realm of the unethical is judged on a
spectrum.
Stark notes the emphasis on fraud in the current Model
Rules, and posits a theory of "intersectionality" where client behavior
falls on a spectrum ranging from legal and not fraudulent, to criminal
and fraudulent. 83 A lawyer's actions in assisting the client move in
tandem from ethical to unethical in relation to the client's84place on the
spectrum, with some gray area at the midpoint of the scale.
Yet, according to Duhl, the Model Rules do provide some concrete
guidance as to where certain types of drafter behavior will fall on such
an ethical scale. Specifically, Model Rule 1.0 defines the term "fraud"
for purposes of discipline to require "a purpose to deceive." 85 Duhl
suggests that some form of scienter by the attorney must be present for
the fraud-based Model Rules he identifies (1.2(d), 4.1(a), (b), 8.4) to be
violated.86 Additionally, no reliance or injury need occur,87 as the
Model Rules themselves do not require such. 88 According to Duhl, the
inquiry into violation of the Model Rules on the basis of fraud turns on
the existence of intent to deceive by the attorney, rather than the
outcome or injury.
80. Id. at 996 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(d), 4.1(b), 8.4(c)).
81. Duhl, Ethics, supranote 28, at 994.
82. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supranote 1, at 458.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Duhl, Ethics, supranote 28, at 996 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0).
86. Id.
87. See contra RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 9 (AM LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2014) (defining a party liable for fraud as "one who fraudulently makes a material misrepresentation of
fact, opinion, intention, or law, for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting, is
subject to liability for economic loss caused by the other's justifiable'reliance on the misrepresentation").
88. Duhl, Ethics, supra note 28, at 996.
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Duhl notes that one of the clearest behaviors that could land an
attorney in disciplinary hot water is knowingly incorporating
misrepresentations of material facts, such as misstatements of company
financial information, into a contract. 89 If the contract is executed, the
attorney has assisted a fraud in violation of Rule 1.2(d), and even if the
contract stalls, the inclusion by the attorney of the terms in a draft
contract could constitute an indirect "representation that the statements
are true" in violation of Rules 4. 1(a) and 8.4.90
Duhl notes additional drafting behaviors on the clearly-fraudulent end
of the spectrum, including attorneys' failure disclose scrivener's errors
made by opposing parties, and concealment or failure to point out
alterations to a document. 91 Duhl's examination of the "more subtle
form[s],, 92 of potential drafting fraud are of more interest and paint a
closer picture to the question at hand, dealing with the use of innovative
and untested plain language in contract drafting.
In his analysis of drafting behavior that runs afoul of the Model Rules
as currently interpreted, Duhl notes two types of behavior that fall into
the gray area between clearly fraudulent and clearly permissible. The
first being the use of "conscious ambiguity," which Duhl defines as an
attorney's knowing use of "a clause in an agreement with two
contradictory meanings" or to which "the parties attach different
meanings. 9 3 Duhl notes that such behavior "at its extreme" could be
considered "'dishonest' and violate Rule 8.4. 9
Next, Duhl delves into the biggest gray area, the inclusion of "iffy" or
potentially "invalid" terms. 95 The types of terms Duhl highlights
include "impermissible" clauses that "mislead parties"---especially
consumers-as to their rights. 96 He determines that the inclusion of
such clauses could rise to the level of fraud in violation of Model Rule
known to be invalid and likely to
1.2(d), but only where the clause is
97
mislead-rather than merely "iffy.",

While "iffy" or unenforceable clauses pose a slightly different
consideration from the re-drafting of traditional clauses into modem
language, the ethical implications are similar. In the case of an untested
89. Id.at 998.
90. Id. at 998.
91. Id. at 1002-05.
92. Id. at 1009.
93. Duhl, Ethics, supranote 28, at 1009.
94. Id. at 1011.
95. Id. at 1012.
96. Id. at 1013 (discussing the example of draft-release waivers limiting liability to minors for
injuries incurred in a bicycle race, where the waivers are known to be invalid if challenged on the basis
of the riders' age).
97. Id.
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construction of a traditional term, a lawyer is less sure of the potential
judicial interpretation of a clause. Therefore, using such a clause brings
more potential risk than the use of a tested clause. It follows that Duhl's
recognition of the heightened burden of knowledge about the clause's
potential enforceability applies in both circumstances.
By analogizing the drafting of "iffy" clauses to the redrafting of tested
terms into untested modem language, it becomes clear that the Model
Rules require a measure of research-based knowledge as to the meaning
and enforceability of untested contract terms before they are included in
a contract. This Article continues by positing that this knowledge
requirement invokes the drafting attorney's ethical obligations of
competence, allocation of authority, diligence, and communication.
IV. APPLYING THE MODEL RULES TO MODERN DRAFTING STYLE

Due to the focus on fraudulent drafting, ethics scholars overlook the
potential applicability of other core ethical rules to the practice of
transactional drafting. Specifically, Model Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4,
concerning competence, allocation of authority, diligence, and
communication respectively, are not frequently or deeply discussed in
connection with the ethical duties of attorneys drafting contracts. 98
However, each of the aforementioned rules applies when one views
transactional attorneys as advocates engaged in persuasive word choices
advancing client interests. The Model Rules themselves recognize that
all attorneys, even transactional attorneys, carry the role of advocate, by
requiring all attorneys to "act with competence, commitment and
dedication to the interest of the client ...upon the client's behalf."99

The Model Rules discussed below put in place important safeguards
on lawyers' behavior as advocates, and certainly apply to attorneys
making non-traditional language choices in contracts. These advocacyoriented rules require the lawyer to be fully informed of the relevant
precedent, to undertake the work necessary to be assured that unique
phrasing of clauses does not disadvantage the client, and to keep the
client informed of and involved in the decisions the lawyer makes
concerning word choices.
The potential impact of each of these Model Rules on the behavior of
attorneys using non-traditional terms will be discussed. The analysis
will begin with the competence and diligence rules, and then analyze the
allocation of authority and communication rules in tandem.

98. See generally MODEL RULES

OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.4 (2012).

99. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6.
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A. Model Rule 1.1-Competence
The competence duty under the Model Rules requires that "[a] lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client," which entails "the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."' 10 0 Broadly speaking, this duty
imposes upon attorneys "an ethical obligation to write well."' 1 1 Simply
school or in practice
being "exposed to contract drafting" either in law
10 2
draft.
competently
to
attorney
an
prepare
not
does
Expertise in drafting, as in any legal discipline, can be obtained
through "necessary study," as provided in the comments to Model Rule
1.1.103 However, competence in drafting requires not only a "thorough
grounding in contract law" but also a more nuanced understanding of
how the law "is to be applied on behalf of the client."' 1 4 A core
competency in contract drafting requires adequate satisfaction of the
"client's wishes by the provisions of the document." 10 5 In this way, the
competence duty necessitates client advocacy, in conjunction with the
requirement that the document be appropriately drafted and enforceable.
Further, the transactional attorney, like any other lawyer, "should be
careful in performing legal work." 10 6 Specifically, it long has been
noted that the duties of an attorney structuring a transaction require "an
examination of legal and extra-legal indicators, the most wellrecognized of which is how a court will respond to a given factual
situation., 10 7 The drafter must consider whether "a court will rule
unfavorably if certain facts occur."' 1 8 To make these determinations, a
transactional lawyer must attain a strong "background in the legal rules
for keeping
governing contract interpretation" as well as "a routine
'0 9
current on relevant statutory mandates and case law."'
This level of competence requires knowledge of the typical
interpretation of tested terms and recognition that non-traditional word
choices may give rise to unpredictable applications by a court in a
Therefore, in fulfilling her ethical
variety of factual scenarios.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1.

101. Brian M. Kubicki, The Practiceof Writing, 52 RES GESTAE 252, 252 (2008).
102. Lisa L. Dahm, PracticalTips for DraftingContracts and Avoiding Ethical Issues, 46 TEX. J.
BUS. L. 89, 89 (2014).
103. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2.

104. Dahm, supra note 102, at 93.
105. MELISSA H. WERESH, LEGAL WRITING: ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 196

(2d ed. LexisNexis 2009).
106. Michael L. Shakman et al., There but for the Grace of God Go I: A Look at the Modern
TransactionalLegal Malpractice Case, 18 CBA REC. 32, 35 (2004).
107. Brown & Brown, supranote 32, at 461.
108. Id. at 461.
109. Nehf, supranote 22, at 156.
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obligations, the drafter must recognize her duty as an advocate of the
client and consider whether the use of a non-traditional term helps or
harms the client if the contract falls into dispute.
In a rare, early discussion of the competence duty as it relates to the
role of the transactional attorney, an article by ethics scholars Louis M.
Brown and Harold A. Brown noted that competence is best served in the
transactional context by considering the "damage which could be done
to the [transactional] client by incompetence." 110
Therefore,
competence in the transactional context requires not merely knowledge
of the applicable law, but also applying a lawyer's legal knowledge to
the particular needs of a particular client.1 11
The transactional lawyer's "aspirations of competence" should
include attaining "the knowledge and skill to grasp the client's goals, to
reframe them if necessary, to initiate the discussion of alternative
courses of conduct and, along with the client, to be creative regarding
the uses of the law." 112 This early framing of the duty by the Brown
article implicitly requires that the transactional attorney use the law in
the way most beneficial to achieving such client goals.
A more recent article provides another framework for applying the
competence rule to transactional attorneys. Christina Kunz posits that
transactional attorneys drafting contracts have a heightened competence
duty when it comes to potentially invalid clauses.1 13 She notes that
Comment 2 to Model Rule 1.1 mentions "some important legal skills,
such as the analysis of precedent . . . and legal drafting, [that] are
required in all legal problems." ' 1 4 Such problems include drafting
contract terms and require the analysis of precedent concerning the
potential interpretation the term. Kunz focuses on substantively "iffy"
clauses, but the uncertainty of judicial interpretation associated with
untested variations of traditional terms is analogical.
This duty to research and inform is particularly high where, as Kunz
notes, the particular clause has been "criticized" in another
jurisdiction.1 15 In such a case, Kunz suggests that "[t]he lawyer should
seriously consider urging the client to consider practicalities," such as
effects on the "parties' relationship, performance on both sides, public
perceptions, other contracts with the same language and other

110. Brown & Brown, supra note 32, at 467-68.
111. Id. at468.
112. Id. at 476.
113. Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and "Iffy" Contract Clauses, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L.

REV. 487, 503 (2006).
114. Id. at 503 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2) (internal quotations
omitted).
115. Id. at 503-04.
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concurrent negotiations."
The same considerations ring true for a lawyer's decision to rephrase
a clause with a settled meaning into terms that have a less predictable
method of interpretation in the courts. The lawyer must consider and
advise the client of potential risks concerning the way other parties will
view the clause, whether other contracts exist which use the more
modem language in lieu of the traditional phrases, whether those
contracts have been litigated, and the view of the jurisdiction in which
the contract will be enforced.
Further, the duty to be informed about the view of the jurisdiction in
which the contract will be enforced is critically important to drafting a
contract that provides benefit to the client, a recognized goal of the
transactional attorney. 117 Since contracts are essentially authorless
documents, it has been recognized in literary scholarship that contracts
"enlist the attendant authority of the law."11 8
Thus, courts'
interpretations of the meaning of contract language become a critically
important mode by which a drafter can set boundaries around meaning,
and therefore control potential outcomes for a client.11 9
It is settled that liability for legal malpractice may not arise in
circumstances where the law is unsettled as to whether to include certain
terms in a document. However, this does not negate the fact that
"[legal uncertainty can manifest in the preparation of documents if the
120
precise language and content have not been judicially construed."
This uncertainty affects the decision whether the competent lawyer
should rephrase a tested term into a modem, untested variation.
While attorneys are not "required to predict infallibly how a court will
interpret documents that they have drafted," 12 1 the competence duty
requires "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation."' 122 This baseline level of
knowledge includes knowledge about the preferred phrasing of terms, or
at the very least, current, applicable judicial interpretations of terms
selected.
The requirement of deeply researching and understanding the impact
of rephrasing terms as an element of competency is heightened in the
116. Id. at 504.
117. Brown & Brown, supranote 32, at 460-61.
118. Tal Kastner, What is a Contract?: The Absent Author of the Written Contract and the
Function of Certain Conventions of Drafting and Construction 6 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper No.
814068, 2005), http://ssm.com/abstract-814068.
119. Id. at 6-7.
120. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN, WITH ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §19:14

(2016).
121. See id.
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1.
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context of contract drafting, because "each word or provision in a
contract may be subjected to greater scrutiny and challenge by opposing
counsel whereas the meanings of words or phrases in a brief or pleading
are rarely the primary target or focus of even the most zealous
advocate. 12 3
And yet, even in litigation documents, such as complaints, where
word choices are of less import, the competent attorney is exhorted to
rely on "legal precedent" and perform "sufficient research and analysis"
124
to be assured that the document adequately advances a client's claim.
It has been considered a failure of competence to advance "novel claims
and new interpretations of law" in a complaint insufficiently supported
by precedent. 1
Similarly, the competent transactional lawyer should
not use untested terms in a contract without a deep, thoroughly
researched consideration of the consequences on enforceability, parties'
behaviors, and potential judicial interpretations.
B. Model Rule 1.3-Diligence
The diligence duty under the Model Rules requires that "[a] lawyer..
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client," 126 including "tak[ing] whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client's cause." 127 In fulfilling this duty, the
lawyer must act "with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf," yet the
"lawyer is not bound . . .to press for every advantage that may be
128
realized for a client.',
Further, because the diligence duty requires "promptness,'' 29 the
"modifying [of] a previously drafted contract," which would likely
include tested terms of art, "require[s] significantly less time than
drafting a contract from scratch." 130 Such widely-available contracts
and terms not only aid the attorney in meeting the promptness
requirement, but may also assist in furthering the interests of the client,
as traditionally-composed contracts are often "generally accepted within
123. Dahn, supranote 102, at 91.
124. WERESH, supra note 105, at 111.
125. Id. (discussing In re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117 (N.M. 1999), where an attorney was
disciplined for violating the New Mexico equivalent of Model Rule 1.1 based on draffing a complaint
for a counterclaim premised upon a novel interpretation of federal "common law lien" theory that the
court determined to lack good faith).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.r1.0cmt. 1.
Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1.
Id.r. 1.3.
Dahm, supra, note 102, at 97.
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the industry" in which the client operates.' 31
Of course, the competence duty requires that such standard forms be
fully understood, researched, and reviewed, so as not be used
"blindly." 132 As noted, "[g]ood drafting takes care, practice, sound
judgment, and a lot of effort."' 33 Nonetheless, the "'precedent-based
drafting approach'. . . makes sense' 134 in many circumstances,
particularly where clients are fee-sensitive, operate in a highly
standardized industry, or the lawyer has developed the forms based on
research and practice experience.
As has been noted by drafting scholars, "the lawyer owes a duty to
the client to keep ... legal fees on a diet," a goal which can be achieved
through drafting a contract which "rais[es] few issues."' 135 The higher
risk and added research burdens arising under the competence duty
when using untested language would undoubtedly increase fees.
Therefore, particularly with regard to fee-sensitive clients, use of nontraditional language and the attendant increase in related research fees
may constitute an unethical disservice.
In all cases, the lawyer has a duty to communicate with the client at
the outset of the relationship concerning the client's expectations
regarding fees, 136 as well as the client's tolerance for increased costs
based on non-traditional language changes. 137 Discussion of these
issues comprises the basis of the allocation of authority between the
attorney and client, as well as the communication duty of the attorney,
which will be discussed below.
C. Model Rules 1.2 and 1.4-Allocation ofAuthority & Communication
Model Rule 1.2 provides that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, as
required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued.' ' 138 The comments to Model Rule 1.2
make clear that decisions concerning "the purpose" of the representation
are allocated to the client, while the decisions of the lawyer are entitled
to deference concerning the "means to be used to accomplish [client]
objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Nehf, supra,note 22, at 155.
134. Dahm, supra, note 102, at 96-97.
135. Peter Siviglia, Designs for Courses on Drafting Contracts, 12 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING
89, 97 (2009).
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b).
137. Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 2.
138. Id. r. 1.2(a).
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This allocation of authority regarding the "means" of the
representation, however, is subject to communication with the client, 14as0
emphasized in the text of and comments to Model Rule 1.2(a).
Specifically, Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.2 invokes the communication
requirement under Model Rule 1.4(a)(2) concerning the means utilized
by the lawyer to achieve the client's objective. To properly follow this
rule, a lawyer must "reasonably consult with the client about the means
by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished.' ' 14 1 The duties
under Model Rules 1.2 and 1.4 are therefore inextricably linked when
dealing with choices made by a transactional attorney in drafting
documents on a client's behalf
Specifically, it has been recognized by scholars of drafting ethics that
"[i]n drafting documents on behalf of a client, the lawyer clearly has an
obligation to explain the contents of those documents to the client so
that the client understands the legal ramifications of executing the
documents. ' 142 Further, even where the "underlying conduct of the
attorney is appropriate" there exists a requirement to advise the client
about the consequences of a proposed construction of a contract. 143
Thus, the research and recognition of potential uncertainty associated
with the use of untested terms required under the competence duty
trigger an enhanced duty to inform the client under Model Rule
1.4(a)(2).
This requirement enhances the historical view of the
heightened requirements of Model Rule 1.4 in the transactional
setting. 144 In the context of a transactional representation, the client is
the lawyer's "raison d'etre"'145 and therefore the "amount of
communication" required to ensure the lawyer is fulfilling
the client's
46
1
practice.
litigation
in
than
greater"
much
be
goal "may
Christina Kunz in her article on drafting ethics under the UCC notes
that "[i]n many situations, a candid dialogue between lawyer and client
will resolve the ethical tension" associated with the selection of "iffy"

139. Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 2.
140. Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 1.
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2).

142. WERESH, supra note 105, at 199.
143. Id. (discussing Winston v. Brogan, 844 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Fla. 1994)). In Winston, attorneys
transferred estate assets to a marital trust in a novel attempt to avoid tax liability, and had the beneficiary
sign a verification of such transfer that was not fully explained. Winston, 844 F. Supp. at 753-55. This
deprived the beneficiary of outright distribution of the assets as originally provided in decedent's will.
Id. at 755. The court found the attorneys liable by taking particular note of their failure to advise the
beneficiary. Id.
144. Brown & Brown, supra,note 32, at 467.
145. Id.
146. Id.at 460.
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clauses. 147 She notes the need for balance between the rights of
opposing parties and the requirement for zealous representation as
motivating the lawyer's decisions regarding how to draft clauses in these
148
circumstances.
Thus, in deciding whether to incorporate a non-traditional
construction of a tested term, a transactional attorney has the duty to
consult and communicate with the client regarding the potential
outcomes and uncertainty associated with such choice. This duty has
not been clearly delineated with regard to the transactional practitioner.
However, as the interpretation of an untested term certainly could
impact the outcome and enforcement of a contract by a judge, this
decision inherently is connected to the "objectives" or outcomes of the
representation. 149
Model Rule 1.2 allocates decisions concerning the outcome of
representation to the client. Model Rule 1.2 requires careful explanation
by the attorney before such rephrasing occurs. Additionally, the lawyer
should defer to the client concerning associated potential increases in
fees. 150 Practically speaking, the Model Rules require the attorney to
explain and confirm with the client the decision to cast aside traditional
terms of art in a contract that has well-documented, consistent judicial
interpretations. This is particularly true where tested interpretations
effectively achieve the client's objective at a lower cost.
Further, a failure of the attorney to gain an understanding of the
nature of the client's "business objectives" could also lead to an inability
to meet the requirements of Model Rule 1.2.151 This is especially true
where the client operates in a particular industry. Typically, industries
will operate and communicate using specialized "customs and jargon,"
the understanding of which may be essential to achieving the client's
goals. 152
In such cases, redrafting of tested terms, even where helpful to clarity
or brevity, may undercut the client's position vis-A-vis contracting
parties in a heavily regulated industry. Model Rules 1.2 and 1.4,
properly viewed, require consultation with the client concerning the
potential impact on client objectives in these circumstances. As a result,
revision of traditional terms into alternative language may lead to
frustration of client goals, potentially resulting in ethical violations.
This discussion ebbs into the practical considerations of how a
147. Kunz, supra note 113, at 510.
148. Id.
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).

150. Id. at crnt. 2.
151. Dahm, supra note 102, at 94.
152. Id.
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transactional attorney can meet their ethical duties when faced with the
call for a broader use of plain language. In order to better understand
the problems posed by language choices, and the ethical implications of
the behavior of drafters in making these choices, one must turn to case
studies of attorneys in practice.
V. CASE STUDIES: DRAFTERS & LANGUAGE CHOICE

In order to demonstrate the problem faced by drafters when seeking to
modernize traditional language, one must analyze specific suggestions
made by plain language drafting commentators and apply the holdings
of recent case law dealing with such language choices. The below
examples constitute only a handful of recent instances of courts'
interpretations of traditional contract language to the detriment of
Further, in order to illustrate the 'duty to
contract parties. 153
of these changes to clients, one also must
impact
the
communicate
review malpractice decisions concerning languages choices.
A. The Problem of Shall vs. Will
One of the most pioneering recent suggestions for the modernization
of contract language comes from Bryan Garner, who instructs drafters to
"[d]elete every shall."154 Garner correctly notes that shall very often is
misused by drafters. 155 The term shall is "supposed to mean 'has a duty
drafters who pair it with "neither" or
to,"' but it often is distorted by
"nothing," to alter its meaning. 156
Despite the efforts of other drafting experts to reform and standardize
the use of shall (by instructing drafters to limit their use of the term only
to statements of obligation), 157 Garner is still safe to surmise that based
on its rampant misuse, the term "shall is a mess." 158 Garner notes that a
shall-less style in transactional drafting is preferable and suggests the
153. See also VFC Partners 26, LLC v. Cadlerocks Centenntial Drive, LLC, 735 F.3d 25, 31-32
(1st Cir. 2013) (holding that failure to use the "typical language parties often use to introduce a list of
non-exclusive examples, such as 'shall include but not be limited to' . . .weigh[ed] against reading the
..sentence as a list of non-exclusive examples").
154. GARNER, supra note 4, at 125.
155. Id.
156. Id. For example, compare the correct, obligatory usage "The Purchaser shall pay
$5,000,000" with the permissive usage "Neither party shall assign this Agreement without prior written
consent."
157. See Kenneth A. Adams, BanishingShall from Business Contracts: Throwing the Baby Out
With the Bathwater, 24 AUSTL. CORP. LAW. 12 (Sept. 2014), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/wp/wpSTARK, DRAFTING
contentluploads/2014/09/Banishing-Shall-from-Business-Contracts-ACLA.pdf;
CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 151-52.
158. GARNER, supranote 4, at 126.
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159
use of the term "will" to indicate obligation.
While Garner and the other critics of shall have a valid point,' 60 that
the misuse of the term is endemic, the ethical drafter must consider in
each circumstance whether the appropriate use of the term might be
more likely to achieve a client's goals. In order to fulfill the duties of
competence and diligence, a lawyer must be informed as to whether
controlling law in the jurisdiction in which the contract will be enforced
has criticized the use of "will" as an alternative.
For example, a recent case out of the Supreme Court of Texas refused
to find an obligation where the term "will" was used. 161 In the Lubbock
opinion, the court interpreted the terms of a lease between the Lubbock
County Water Control and Improvement District (the Water District)
162
and Church & Akin, L.L.C. (the Company).
The Water District had leased property to the Company, on which the
163
Company operated a marina, gasoline station, and convenience store.
The lease provided, in pertinent part, that "[t]he marina will issue
catering tickets that will be redeemed at the gate for admittance to the
lake. These tickets will be redeemed by the marina at the price of $1.00
' 164
each.. They will only be available to persons coming into the marina.
Counsel for the Company argued this provision obligated the
Company to regulate access to the marina, thus providing a service to
the Water District for purposes of obtaining a waiver of the Water
District's sovereign immunity. 165 The court disagreed, based in part on
a finding that the language did not "constitute an agreement by [the
Company] to provide a service" to the Water District. 166 Specifically,
the court noted that the provision created no "implied duty" on the part
of the Company to issue the tickets. 1 67 Rather, the court found that the
provision stood for the proposition that the Company "intended to" issue
168
the tickets.

159. Id. See also BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 953-54 (3d ed.
2011).
160. See generally Joseph Kimble, The Many Misuses of "Shall", 3 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING

61(1992).
161. Lubbock Cty. Water Control v. Church & Akin, L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. 2014); see
also D.C. Toedt, Drafting Tip: Define "will" as meaning "must", ON CONTRACTS (July 4, 2014),

http://www.oncontracts.com/drafting-tip-define-will-as-meaning-must/.
162. Lubbock Cty., 442 S.W.3d at 299.
163. Id.

164. Id at 305 (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. Id. at306.
167. Lubbock Cty.,
442 S.W.3d at 307.
168. Id.This reading is consistent with drafting expert Tina Stark's criticisms of the use of the
term "will" to indicate obligation, noting that it functions as a statement of intended future performance,
rather than the immediate creation of a duty. STARK,DRAFTING CONTRACTS, supranote 1, at 151-52.
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The court's majority opinion was met with a vigorous dissent,
agreeing with the Company's position that the disputed term created an
obligation sufficient to fall under the statutory waiver of immunity
applied to contracts for provision of services to a government entity.

The dissent argued that "[i]n this context, 'will,' although it has many
possible meanings depending on context, here indicates a mandatory

requirement."'69
Nonetheless, this opinion creates a strong uncertainty as to whether
Garner's preferred method of obligating parties to act is enforceable in a

Texas court. Based on the ethical duties discussed in Part IV, it is clear
that a competent, diligent attorney practicing in Texas would do well to
research this issue, and if the attorney intended to use the term "will," as
suggested by Garner, advise the client of the associated risks of
These risks also
enforcement. 170
modernizations, as discussed below.

exist

with

other

proposed

B. The Problem of Claims "Arising Out of or Relating to" a Contract
The phrase "arising out of or relating to" is a consistently used
1 71
component of many contracts' dispute resolution provisions.

Traditionally, contract drafters who desire a broad arbitration provision
provide that mandatory arbitration applies to disputes "arising out of or
relating to" the particular contract, 1 72 and those who desire a more

narrow construction use the phrase "arising under" the contract. 173 The

addition of the phrase "relating to" is typically interpreted to broaden the
arbitration provision to apply not only to contract disputes, but also74to
1
other disputes such as tort claims between the parties to the contract.

169. Lubbock Cty., 442 S.W.3dat 311 (Willett, J., dissenting).
170. Gamer's suggestion for removing "shall" and replacing it with alternate terms also has met
resistance in the rulemaking context. The 2007 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
removed "shall" in Rule 56 and replaced it with "should." Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43
AKRON L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2010). The use of "shall" was reinstated by amendments to Rule 56
effective on December 1, 2010. See generally 11-56 STEVEN S. GENSLER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE. (3d ed. 2012). The reversion to "shall" was based in part on comments
"arguing that the style translation had been a mistake." Gensler, supra, at 1.
171. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 4, at § 13.18.
172. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398
(1967); Mehler v. Terminix International Co., 205 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2000); Drews Distributing Inc. v.
Silicon Gaming, Inc., 245 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2001); Fyrnetics Ltd., v. Quantum Group, Inc., 293 F.3d
1023 (7th Cir. 2002).
173. See, e.g., In the Matter of Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 952-953 (2d Cir. 1961); Pennzoil
Exploration and Production Co. v. Ramco Energy Limited, 139 F.3d 1061, 1076 (5th Cir. 1998);
Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 720 (9th Cir. 1999).
174. TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE 186 (ALM
Publishing 2003) [hereinafter STARK, BOILERPLATE]; see also PSI Energy Inc. v. AMAX, Inc., 644
N.E.2d 96, 97-100 (Ind. 1994) (indicating that an agreement to arbitrate claims "arising out of or
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Plain-language drafting proponent Kenneth Adams expresses
concerns related to the use of the traditional language as the method to
set the scope of the coverage of dispute resolution provisions.
Specifically, Adams notes that:
It would indeed be a good idea to state precisely the
types of claims that are to be submitted to arbitration.
But instead of precision, arising out of or relating to
uses two vague standards that offer little predictability as
to what falls within the scope of the provision. In
particular, invoking the broader relating to standard
could result in a party's being unpleasantly surprised by
the consequences of something unexpectedly falling
within the scope of the provision.175
As an alternative, Adams suggests focusing on "the transaction
contemplated by the contract."1 76 For example, with regard to a
confidentiality provision, Adams suggests using the phrase "any
disputes arising out of this agreement or the Recipient's handling,
disclosure, or use of any Confidential Information."'77 According to
Adams, this approach would permit parties to bring a "broad but
predictable set of claims within the scope of a provision."178
However, Adams' approach fails to take into account the consistently
broad judicial interpretations of arbitration clauses, however phrased,
particularly in the federal courts. 179 In fact, the issue of unpredictable

judicial interpretation is not necessarily solved by the use of a more
transaction-focused arbitration provision. In a recent case, the Court of
Appeals of Georgia ordered arbitration based on a broad interpretation
80
of a very specific, transaction-oriented clause. 1
In Kormanik, Chris and Mary Kormanik sued DBGS, LLC d/b/a
DirectBuy of Greenville (DirectBuy) for negligent misrepresentation
based on shoddy work by a contractor recommended to them by
DirectBuy. 181 The Kormanik's membership agreement with DirectBuy
provided:
relating to" a coal supply contract made the arbitration clause "all encompassing"); Abrey Partners V,
L.P. v. F & W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1055 (Del. Ch. 2006) (noting that the phrase "to have
arisen out of or to have resulted from . . . bespeaks of breadth" in the choice of law context, extending
over fraud claims in addition to contract claims).
175. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 4, at §§ 13.23-24.
176. Id. § 13.26
177. Id. § 13.28.
178. Id.§ 13.26.
179. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
180. DBGS, LLC v. Kormanik, 775 S.E.2d 283,285 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
181. Id.
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[DirectBuy] staff and . . . [o]wners stand ready to help
you resolve any problem you may encounter with your
Membership or with any order you place through
DirectBuy, but if we are not able to achieve a
satisfactory resolution for you, you and we agree to
avoid the needless delays, expenses, and uncertainties of
court proceedings by submitting all such unresolved
disputes exclusively 1 82to private, expedited, and
confidential arbitration.'
DirectBuy sought to arbitrate the Kormaniks' claim regarding the
recommended contractor pursuant to the foregoing provision, but the
trial court denied DirectBuy's motion to compel arbitration "on the
ground that the Kormaniks' claim for negligent misrepresentation
concerning the contractor recommendation did not involve their
DirectBuy membership or... a problem with their order."'1 83 However,
noting Georgia's "clear
the Court of Appeals of Georgia '1reversed,
84
arbitration."
of
favor
in
policy
public
The use of the phrase "any problem you may encounter with your
Membership or with any order" comes closer to Adams' suggestion that
arbitration provisions focus on the "transaction contemplated by the
contract" (in this case, the Kormaniks' membership in a company
selling home furnishings and fixtures). 185 However, the court in
Kormanik imposed a far broader reading of the provision than either
arbitration on a claim relating to
party could have predicted, compelling 86
recommendation.'
contractor
outside
an
The court took guidance from the broad interpretation of arbitration
clauses in federal cases, noting that Georgia's arbitration code "closely
tracks" federal arbitration law.1 87 The court found that "[a]s a matter of
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration."' 88 The court looked to the "factual
allegations in the complaint" rather than the "legal causes of action" to
determine that the negligent misrepresentation claim fell under the
seemingly narrow arbitration clause. 189
Thus, the parties to the contract in Kormanik, should they have
desired to keep their arbitration clause more narrow, would have been

182. Id. at 284-85 (emphasis added).
183. Id.at285.
184. Id.
185. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 4, at §§ 13.26-28.

186. Kormanik,775 S.E.2d at 285.
187. Id.
188. Id.

189. Id.
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better served by including the traditional narrowing phrase "arising
under" (which was absent from the arbitration clause in question).19 °
Instead, the use of non-traditional, transaction-focused language, led to
an unpredictable judicial result.
The court's broad interpretation of the language in Kormanik
demonstrates the potentially unpredictable results of an arbitration
clause, even one that follows Adams' advice to focus on the transaction
rather than traditional scope-defining terms. 19 1 The Kormanik case
makes clear that even a very detailed, non-traditional construction can
still lead to an unpredictable result based on the policies of the
jurisdiction in which the language is interpreted.
Based on this precedent and the associated risk of broad
interpretation, the competent and diligent drafter should research
precedent of the jurisdiction in which the contract is likely to be
enforced to determine how broadly an arbitration agreement will be
construed and advise the client with regard to the risks associated with
any proposed construction of the term. 192 Even a seemingly narrow
construction of a clause term might lead to more unpredictable results
than a traditional term, depending on judicial interpretation.
C. Malpractice andInforming the Client
The foregoing cases provide examples of outcomes of non-traditional
drafting resulting in injury to a client's position. These cases highlight
the need for competence and diligence in researching and understanding
the laws of the jurisdiction in which a drafter works in order to make
informed language choices. However, neither case discusses the duties
of the drafter during the contract formation phase in communicating
with clients concerning potential language changes.
Cases concerning violations of Model Rule 1.4 dealing with
communication in the transactional context are scarce. Therefore, one
must turn to legal malpractice cases to find examples of the level of
communication required between lawyer and client when considering
language changes in contracts during the negotiation and drafting
phases. Malpractice cases have imposed a requirement for attorneys to
explain operative language choices to clients, even sophisticated clients,
if those language changes can have potential consequences of

190.
191.
192.
arbitration
states").

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 4, at § 13.26.
See STARK, BOILERPLATE, supranote 174, at 185 (noting that "[s]tate courts have interpreted
provisions both narrowly and broadly. Practitioners should be sure to check the cases in their
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interpretation. 1
In a relevant case before the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, the law firm of Mandel, Resnik & Kaiser (Mandel) was
retained to represent E.I. Electronics, Inc. (EIE) in a transaction whereby
EIE "was to be acquired, in whole or in part," by General Electric
(GE). 194 The court laid out the stages of the proposed transaction:
The acquisition was structured in three stages: (1) an
initial purchase [by GE] of a 35% interest [in EIE], (2) a
call option exercisable by GE enabling it to purchase an
additional 14% interest and (3) a put option exercisable
by [EIE] requiring GE to purchase the remaining interest
in [EIE].' 95
An original version of the agreement drafted by the Mandel firm
provided that EIE's put option (forcing GE to buy the remaining shares
in EIE), was exercisable at any time after GE's call option period
expired. 196 The final, signed version, however, included a change made
by the Mandel firm, in response to negotiations with GE's attorneys,
that made the exercise of the put option conditional on the call option
having been exercised. 197 In essence, the final version, as drafted by the
put option
Mandel firm, made EIE's ability to exercise the 1lucrative
98
first.
option
call
its
exercising
GE's
upon
contingent
Erran Kagan, the principal of EIE, a sophisticated businessman and
licensed attorney, later disputed the changes to the agreement and
refused to pay Mandel's attorney's fees. 199 Mandel sued EIE for unpaid
fees, and EIE counterclaimed for legal malpractice. In the counterclaim,
EIE alleged that the Mandel firm, in negotiating and drafting the terms
of the put option, permitted changes to the provision not sufficiently
explained to Erran Kagan. 20 0 EIE and Kagan claimed that the effect of
the changes robbed them of their ability to exercise their desired put
option.2 ° 1
In denying the Mandel firm's motion for summary judgment on the

193. See Mandel, Resnik & Kaiser, P.C. v. E.I. Elecs., Inc., 839 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007).

194. Id. at 70.
195. Id. In the basic sense, a "call option" is defined as "the right to require another to sell" and a
"put option" as "the right to require another to buy." Option, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).

196. Corrected Decision/Order at 2-3, Mandel, Resnik & Kaiser, P.C. v. E.I. Elecs., Inc., 839
N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (No. 123360/01), 2006 WL 5110555.
197. Mandel, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
198. Id.
199. Id.

200. Id.
201. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss3/1

30

Johnson: The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting

2016]

ETHICS OF NON-TRADITIONAL CONTRACT DRAFTING

625

malpractice claim and remanding for further fact-finding, the court's
primary concern was that the Mandel firm had "failed to apprise
' '20 2
[Kagan] concerning the effect of the amendment to its put option.
Mandel made "no assertion that the change was discussed with Erran
Kagan or that its significance was explained. 2 °3 The court downplayed
the importance of Kagan's sophistication, noting that a question of fact
remained regarding the "extent of the reliance" by Kagan on Mandel's
advice, and the extent to which Kagan "understood the word 'closing'
20 4
as included in the document.
While the Mandel decision was a malpractice case rather than an
ethics opinion, the court's analysis is instructive with regard to the
competence, diligence, allocation of authority, and communication
duties of an attorney under the Model Rules as discussed in Part IV of
this Article. One of the required elements of a malpractice action in
New York, where the Mandel case was litigated, requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant attorney "failed to exercise the degree of care,
skill, and diligence commonly possessed and exercised by an ordinary
20 5
member of the legal community."
This malpractice standard closely tracks the requirement in Model
Rule 1.1 that requires a competent attorney to use "the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation. ' ' 206 Further, in certain jurisdictions, violations of Model
Rule 1.1 can serve as evidence of malpractice liability, supporting the
close link between the standards asserted under the Model Rule and the
20 7
common law of attorney malpractice.
Thus, the Mandel case stands for the proposition that the competent
lawyer must fully explain the significance of operative language
changes to a client, even in the context of sophisticated transactional
practice. Comparable to the language change in the put option drafted
in the Mandel case, one might envision a situation where changing a
traditional term to more 'modern language might similarly impact the
interpretation and enforcement of a contract, such as occurred in the
Lubbock case.20 8
Mandel makes clear that in order to fulfill the duty of care, a
reasonableness duty analogical to the competence duty in the Model

202.
203.
204.
205.
N.Y.S.2d
206.
207.
208.

Mandel, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Corrected Decision/Order at 6, Mandel, Resnik & Kaiser, P.C. v. E.I. Elecs., Inc., 839
68 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (No. 123360/01), 2006 WL 5110555.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1.
See, e.g., Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 320 (Nev. 2004).
See Johnson, supra note 3, at 469-76.
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Rules, enhanced communication with the client is required before
changes are made to legally significant terms of the contract. This duty
applies to transactional attorneys working to obtain maximum benefit
for their clients. Therefore, ways in which the Model Rules and
enforcement of ethical standards can be enhanced to make this duty
clear and evenly enforced amongst transactional practitioners must be
considered.
This analysis will now turn to consider recommendations as to how
Model Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 can be applied to drafting attorneys in
practice to provide clearer guidelines for modem transactional practice.
One can look at underlying fiduciary duties, existing ABA Opinions,
and the comments to the Model Rules as opportunities to improve
drafter ethics on the front-end and add efficiency and fairness to the
drafting process.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing case studies, it is clear that the ABA and local
bar associations are "contribut[ing] to the problem" facing transactional
attorneys by failing to articulate viable guidelines for attorneys'
language choices in drafting. 20 9 Attorneys who grapple with whether
and how to incorporate changes suggested by contract drafting
commentators, or even by opposing counsel, have little guidance as to
their ethical duties under the Model Rules.
Those who make and enforce these rules must begin to understand the
multi-faceted role of the contract drafter and broaden the applicability of
the rules identified by this Article in Part IV, in order to provide better
guidance to transactional attorneys in making operative language
choices. Below, this Article identifies several options for reimagining
the Model Rules to better guide the transactional attorney as she chooses
the language to advance her client's interests.
These options include viewing the transactional attorney's duty as a
fiduciary duty, using existing ABA Opinions to shape how nontraditional language choices are treated, and providing transactionalfocused comments to Model Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. Each of these
recommendations will be discussed below.
A. FiduciaryDuty as a Touchstone

One method of expanding the applicability of the Model Rules to
transactional practitioners, as suggested by ethics scholar Paula
209. Schaefer, supra note 58, at 253.
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Schaefer, is to shift the touchstone of the legal profession away from
viewing the lawyer's role as a zealous advocate and toward a view of
the lawyer as a fiduciary. 210 This shift helps expand the currently
existing proscriptions on advocacy to capture the role of the modem
transactional attorney, not merely the litigator. This focus on fiduciary
behavior would require the lawyer to "act as a competent, diligent
2 11
attorney" and also to "put the client's interests first.,
The fiduciary-based approach "tells the lawyer to focus on the client's
interests" when emphasizing the client's understanding of risks but
leaves room for other ethical rules to "define when other interests may
or must prevail,, 212 In this way, the use of the fiduciary duty as a
touchstone also advances Gregory Duhl's concept of trust between
parties. 213 A fiduciary acting as a client advocate need not place the
client's interests above all others in all circumstances, as is often
believed to be required under the "zealous advocacy" touchstone
disputed by Schaefer.2 14
Schaefer's approach permits for Duhl's desired cooperative, dealfocused approach to transactional lawyering2 15 while placing client
needs first whenever permissible. In doing so, the fiduciary approach
requires the drafter to inform the client whenever language changes may
have an impact on the client's desired position or outcome, particularly
if the language change could result in uncertainties concerning liability
or enforceability.21 6
This counseling is required under the fiduciary duty framework
because the "[f]iduciary duty requires a lawyer to ask whether a
competent, loyal lawyer would encourage a course of conduct likely to
create legal liability for the client., 217 This same logic suggests that the
loyal and competent lawyer should advise the client of potential
increases in risk associated with non-traditional phrasing of contract
terms.
Therefore, incorporating the fiduciary approach into the traditional
reading of the Model Rules would strengthen the competence, diligence,
allocation of authority, and communication requirements as set forth by
this Article when a transactional attorney seeks to make changes to
traditional language. One challenge with this approach, as noted by

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See id. at 286-99.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 287.
See supra notes 42 through 50 and accompanying text.
Schaefer, supra note 58, at 287-88.
See supra notes 42 through 50 and accompanying text.
See Schaefer, supra note 58, at 287-88.
Id. at287.
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Schaefer, is with the mechanics of incorporating the fiduciary
touchstone into the existing Model Rules.218
Schaefer suggests including references to the existence of the
fiduciary duty in the Preamble to the Model Rules, setting the duty as a
"gap filler" for behavior when the Model Rules otherwise leave
decisions unclear. 2 19 This approach would work particularly well with
regard to the currently-drafted rules which lack clear guidance for the
transactional practitioner, as it would permit for the same analogical
application of the litigation-oriented rules that transactional practitioners
are accustomed to, while providing a baseline and ideal for the specific
behavior adopted.
Another potential challenge to the fiduciary approach is the fear it
constitutes a more nebulous standard than the existing "zealous
advocacy" standard, and that a fiduciary requirement would "expand
attorney liability" or discipline, "even when the attorney acted only
negligently." 220 However, if this requirement to behave as a fiduciary is
incorporated into the Model Rules as currently drafted, this risk could be
avoided by retaining the definitions in the Model Rules that require
scienter on the part of the attorney for fraud-based violations, as
discussed in Part III.D of this Article.
Thus, adopting the fiduciary duty as an underlying touchstone to the
Model Rules would assist transactional attorneys who face thorny
dilemmas concerning language choice issues in sophisticated
transactional practice. This new touchstone would encourage attorneys
to place client interests above competing interests of style or readability,
and require explanation to clients of changes to operative contract terms.
B. Use of Existing ABA Opinions as Guidelines
Another option for reshaping the way contract drafting skills are
governed under the Model Rules would be to review and apply the
reasoning of existing ABA Opinions on similar topics, in order to
provide guidance concerning the expectations for drafter behavior.
ABA Formal Opinions have spoken generally about the ideal behavior
of transactional attorneys in their practice while drafting documents, 22 '
and these general guidelines could translate into more specific
instructions for transactional attorneys seeking to fulfill their duties of

218. Id.at 289-91.
219. Id. at 291-92.
220. Id. at 289-90.
221. See ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974) (discussing
adequate preparation for writing opinions as the basis for transactions involving sales of unregistered
securities).
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competence, diligence, allocation of authority, and communication.
In a particularly helpful opinion from 1974, which was issued in
response to changes in attorney duties under the Securities Act of 1933,
the ABA attempted to set guidelines for the behavior of transactional
attorneys engaging in a novel practice, that of issuing required opinions
on the legality of sales of unregistered securities.22 2 While a slightly
different scenario from the lawyer seeking to utilize untested language
in a contract, this opinion stands as one of the few discussions by the
ABA of the duties of the transactional attorney more generally.
The opinion requires, in connection with the drafting of these
securities opinions, that the attorney "competently and carefully
consider . . .[relevant] facts" and in some circumstances to "review[]
such appropriate documents as are available" in connection with the
transaction. 223 Additionally, the opinion advises the attorney to "make
adequate preparation including inquiry into the relevant facts. 2 24
The opinion notes that "[w]hile the responsibility of the lawyer is to
his client, he must not be oblivious of the extent to which others may be
affected if he is derelict in fulfilling" his responsibility of competent
drafting.2 25 The best transactional attorney, according to this analysis,
goes beyond the mandatory requirements of the applicable conduct
rules, and considers underlying ethical obligations. Being written in
Considerations of the Code as
1974, this opinion cites the Ethical
226
behavior.
encouraged
of
examples
While the Code and the Ethical Considerations were predecessors to
the current Model Rules, these suggestions for the behavior of the
transactional attorney have distinct modern applicability. Similar to the
ideal of the fiduciary duty suggested by Schaefer, the approach of
requiring inquiry into client and transaction facts and underlying
documents, and the balance between client desires and the interests of
others, are guidelines by which every transactional practitioner should
abide.
Specifically, in connection with the modernization of traditional
contract language, the requirements of this ABA Formal Opinion require
inquiry into the position of the client within the transaction and the
underlying interpretations of terms in the relevant jurisdiction. To
achieve this goal, the Model Rules could include language in the
Preamble generally highlighting the underlying duties of transactional
attorneys to be fully familiar with the facts of the specific transaction
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra part HI.A.
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and applicable law concerning the language employed to best achieve
client goals.
Such language in the Preamble would assist in the interpretation and
enforcement of the Model Rules in scenarios involving drafting
disputes, or even begin to reshape the behavior of transactional attorneys
on the front end, reminding them to abide by these duties as they engage
with their clients to draft documents that best achieve client goals.
Particularly, this language would heighten transactional attorneys'
duty of competence by requiring enhanced familiarity with the position
of the client within the transaction and the jurisdiction's views on the
enforcement of key terms. It would also require diligence in the level of
research required into both facts and law, and relevant communication
with, and deference to, the client in understanding and approving
choices of terms.
In this way,. an incorporation of the reasoning of this ABA Formal
Opinion into the Preamble of the Model Rules would help to provide a
touchstone more applicable to the behavior of the transactional lawyer
as advocate. While the current Preamble simply identifies the attorney
advocate as "zealous," highlighting the more nuanced requirements of
advocacy from the transactional perspective would provide needed
depth to the interpretation of the Model Rules highlighted in Part IV of
this Article as applicable to transactional lawyers.
C. Enhanced Comments to the Model Rules

An additional method of clarifying the applicability of the referenced
Model Rules to transactional practice would be the inclusion or editing
of specific comments to each of the Model Rules discussed in Part IV of
this Article. Suggestions for edits to the comments of each Model Rule
will be discussed.
With regard to Model Rule 1.1, the competence duty, it would be
fairly easy to enhance existing commentary to make clear that the
competence duty of a transactional attorney is only fulfilled when she
becomes fully apprised of the factual position of her client and the view
of the jurisdiction in which the contract will be enforced concerning the
enforcement of particular terms. This requires both legal research and
essential client-counseling skills.
Specifically, to enhance the applicability of the competence rule to
transactional Janguage choices, the discussion in Comment 2 to Model
Rule 1.1 of "important legal skills" should be expanded.227 The general
statement that important legal skills include "the analysis of precedent,
227. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2.
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the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting" must be expanded to
address legal drafting as its own discipline with its own concerns.22 8
A specific comment highlighting a requirement for knowledge of the
client's needs, goals, industry, and risk tolerance, as well as the relevant
precedent of the applicable jurisdiction concerning operative provisions
of the contract being drafted would provide transactional lawyers a
much clearer framework for making competent decisions concerning the
phrasing of contract terms.
Further, with regard to the diligence duty under Model Rule 1.3,
Comment 3 concerning timeliness could be expanded to recognize that
the use of forms and tested terms can have benefits when representing a
fee-sensitive client. The Comment should provide that an attorney must
use such forms competently, with knowledge of the meaning and
potential interpretations of each of the operative terms included in the
form. This addition to the Comment would be in keeping with the
requirement in Comment 2 to Model Rule 1.3 that a lawyer's workload
be controlled such that all matters be handled with competence.2 29
Concerning the allocation of authority under Model Rule 1.2 and
communication under Model Rule 1.4, Comments 1 and 2 to Model
Rule 1.2 should be edited to more specifically define the authority of the
attorney in the transactional setting. These Comments should clarify
that determining the "means" 230 of the representation from a
transactional perspective includes consideration of the level of risk
associated with the use of an untested contract term.
The attorney would thus retain discretion to make operative language
choices as part of the means of the representation, but pursuant
Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.2, the lawyer "shall consult" with the client
concerning these means. 231 Therefore, defining the means to include a
consideration of the level of risk would encourage additional
communication and discussion between the lawyer and client
concerning the potential impact of changes to traditional language in
contracts. This enhancement of the communication duty would also
increase trust and efficiency in the attorney-client relationship in the
transactional setting.
VII. CONCLUSION
The modern transactional practitioner makes dozens of decisions
concerning contract language each day. Each of these decisions has the
228. Id.
229. Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 2.
230. Id. r. 1.2 cmts. 1, 2.
231. Id. See also id r. 1.4(a)(2).
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potential to significantly impact the success of a client's transaction.
While the benefits of the plain language movement in contract drafting
are many, including improved clarity, reduced ambiguity, and reduction
of the distance between the client and the contract text, significant risks
are associated with jettisoning all traditional, tested, legally-significant
terms in lieu of phrasing more friendly to lay readers.
The existence of these risks, namely the potential for unforeseen
opposing party behavior and judicial interpretation, implicate the ethical
obligations of the transactional attorney. In order to fulfill the core
ethical duties of competence, diligence, allocation of authority, and
communication, a transactional attorney must carefully consider changes
to terms of art, perform appropriate research into the position of her
client in the transaction and the preferences of the courts in the
applicable jurisdiction, consider the level of risk associated with the new
language, and thoroughly communicate with her client concerning this
risk.
The ethical practitioner must also balance the time and cost associated
with the effective use of non-traditional terms against the wishes and
direction of the client. Many clients, particularly in today's fee-sensitive
legal market, may not be willing to incur the additional costs required
for a transactional attorney to be assured of the enforceability,
effectiveness, and potential interpretation of a novel clause. As such, a
traditional term, even if perhaps less modern and stylish, may be the
appropriate drafting choice.
In order to highlight these duties and provide appropriate guidance,
the Model Rules must be modernized to reflect the multi-faceted and
legally significant role of the transactional attorney as an advocate and
partisan dealmaker. The Model Rules' comments must be revised and
expanded to provide clear guidance to the many practitioners who
undertake these important, high-value, client centric representations
each day. The historical bias viewing only the litigator as an advocate is
a function of a truncated view of the transactional attorney's role, and
must evolve.
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